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SUMMARY
Euroscepticism is often regarded as a monolithic, unitary political phenomenon. After all, Eurosceptic parties, 
movements and voters are united in voicing their opposition to European integration. This, however, is a 
serious misconception: Eurosceptic politics in Western Europe is heterogeneous and dynamic—both among 
political parties and among voters. 
There is significant variation regarding the motivations to reject the European Union (EU). Radical left 
Eurosceptic parties oppose the EU on the basis of socio-economic concerns. Radical right parties reject 
EU integration on the basis of sovereignty arguments and cultural claims. Moreover, political parties’ 
Euroscepticism is by no means static. Although radical right parties are the most forceful political opponents 
of the EU today, a number of significant radical right parties initially supported European unification. 
Crucially, these ideological and temporal variations in Euroscepticism are not solely party-driven. Also voters 
oppose European integration for different ideological reasons and that the extent to which voters on the far left 
and far right have opposed the EU has varied over time. In particular, the era of political integration heralded 
by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) marked a decisive shift for radical right Euroscepticism—as the opposition to 
the EU significantly increased among far right voters since the Maastricht Treaty.
What is more, the impact of Eurosceptic political parties on European Union politics is also heterogeneous 
and dynamic. The presence and success of Eurosceptic parties can have profound repercussion for the ways 
in which political parties with governing experience deal with the issue of European integration. The electoral 
success of Eurosceptic parties and the emphasis on the EU issue by the radical right and the radical left has 
resulted in strategic responses from mainstream parties. This suggests that Euroscepticism does not only 
matter in extreme cases—such as in the case of Brexit, but has a profound impact on the functioning of EU 
politics, both within member states and in Brussels.
Nevertheless, despite mounting evidence of certain responsiveness of mainstream parties and member state 
governments to Euroscepticism, a disconnect between domestic political contestation and EU decision-making 
remains. This hampers an effective response to Eurosceptic politics and potentially stifles meaningful political 
contestation over EU integration.
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INTRODUCTION
hile anti-European Union politics was a fringe phenomenon at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
it is at the core of European politics today. Political parties with distinct anti-European platforms have 
gained considerable electoral representation in recent years.1 That Eurosceptic politics is not without effect 
has become abundantly clear with the narrow victory of the “Leave” camp in the British referendum on EU 
membership in June 2016.2
In 2017, Eurosceptic parties are major contenders in a number of national elections in Western 
Europe. Most recently, Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party, PVV) became the second largest party in the 
Dutch national elections on 15 March 2017 gaining approximately 13% of the vote. Marine Le Pen, leader of 
the Front National, has good chances of coming out on top in the first round of the 2017 French Presidential 
election; like her father 15 years ago. The Federal Republic of Germany, long seen to be immune to radical 
right and Eurosceptic politics, will most likely witness the first entry of a radical right Eurosceptic party in the 
history of the Bundestag, the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD).3 
This Policy Paper demonstrates that Euroscepticism is a political phenomenon subject to significant variation. 
Not only are there important differences between radical right and radical left Euroscepticism, Euroscepticism 
has also evolved over time among both parties and voters. Moreover, this Policy Paper systematically 
reviews academic research which has demonstrated the ways in which Eurosceptic politics indirectly affects 
mainstream party EU attitudes and the process of EU integration as a whole.
The discussion of Euroscepticism focuses on Western Europe for two reasons. First, party competition over 
EU integration has unfolded very differently in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of a prerogative of 
smaller parties on the margins of the political spectrum, Euroscepticism is and has been a component of major 
government parties’ ideologies in Central and Eastern Europe. This has produced very different dynamics 
of party contestation over EU integration. Secondly, the relatively recent accession of the EU has meant that 
European integration has very different connotations in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, 
which hampers effective comparison across time.
This Policy Paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the heterogeneous ideological bases of 
Euroscepticism among radical right and radical left parties in Western Europe as well as their variation over 
time. The second section summarises the developments in Euroscepticism among West European voters. 
Subsequently, the paper discusses findings of recent political science research regarding the effects of 
Euroscepticism on mainstream parties’ attitudes toward European integration. The fifth section sheds light 
on the process of integration in the face of Eurosceptic politics followed by a conclusion.
1.  Yves Bertoncini and Nicole Koenig, “Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Voice vs. Exit?”, Policy Paper N. 121, Jacques Delors Institute, November 2014
2.  Glencross, Andrew. “Why a British Referendum on EU Membership Will Not Solve the Europe Question.” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015): 303–17
3.  Arzheimer, Kai. “The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?” West European Politics 38, no. 3 (2015): 535–56
W
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1. The Ideological Bases of Party-Based Euroscepticism
While Euroscepticism is prevalent across the party system, the main protagonists of party-based Euroscepticism 
in Western Europe can be found on the far left and far right fringes of the party spectrum.4 Radical right 
and radical left parties do not only hold anti-European views, their Euroscepticism is a focal point of their 
ideological profiles. Indeed, although there is significant variation between parties and across countries, 
almost all radical left and radical right parties believe European integration is a particularly salient 
policy issue, and increasingly so.5 In discussing party-based Euroscepticism, this Policy Paper therefore 
specifically focuses on the radical left and radical right Eurosceptic parties. 
The shared commitment of putting opposition to the EU on the political agenda, 
however, does not mean that radical right and radical left parties agree on the reasons 
to oppose “Europe” in the first place. On the contrary, as this section demonstrates, 
the radical left and radical right oppose “Europe” for very different reasons. In 
addition, this section sheds light on the important transformations the radical right’s 
and the radical left’s ideological dispositions toward the EU have undergone.
1.1. Radical Right Euroscepticism 
The radical right rejects supranational integration on the basis of cultural arguments. The rejection of 
European supranational unification of radical right parties is a corollary of the radical right’s 
nativist outlook. Nativism is an ideological perspective which stipulates that only members of the native 
group, namely “the nation”, are legitimate constituents of the polity.6 Only the ethnically or culturally defined 
nation can form the basis of popular sovereignty and endow a polity with legitimacy. As a result, the political 
involvement of non-native peoples, persons or political ideas are regarded as a threat to national integrity. 
The project of European integration is, of course, at odds with this narrow conception of popular sovereignty. 
Supranational integration is predicated on the idea that popular sovereignty is not limited to the nation-state, 
but exists beyond it—either as one “multinational people” or multiple national peoples.
However, not all radical right parties in Western Europe have been consistently against European integration. 
On the contrary, before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, a number of parties now strongly associated with 
Euroscepticism, such as the French Front National or Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party 
Austria, FPÖ), were initially supportive of the EU.7 
In the mid-1980s, Front National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen actively advocated further integration, notably in 
sensitive issue areas such as immigration, “anti-terrorism policy” and border controls. For the FN and a number 
of other parties such as the German Republikaner (Republicans), this initial support for European integration 
stemmed to large part from the belief that European nations should unite as ethnically homogenous entity.8 
Yet, not all radical right parties initially supportive of European unification subscribed to such an ethnic 
conception of European unity. For instance, the EU support of the FPÖ in the 1970s and 1980s was rather a 
consequence of the party’s market-liberal programme at the time.9 Moreover, the Italian Lega Nord (Northern 
League, LN) was in favour of European integration because it deemed the European Economic Community to 
be a useful vehicle for advancing greater regional autonomy.10 
4.  The question of what constitutes Euroscepticism is not uncontested in the political science literature. The radical right and radical left parties defined as Eurosceptic in this 
Policy Paper display EU support scores below 4 in the Ray / Chapel Hill Expert Survey expert survey data, which corresponds with the definition of “soft” and Euroscepticism 
made by Szczerbiak and Taggart. See: Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart. “Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation.” SEI 
Working Papers, no. 36 (2000): 6; Ray, Leonard. “Validity of Measured Party Positions on European Integration: Assumptions, Approaches, and a Comparison of Alternative 
Measures.” Electoral Studies 26, no. 1 (March 2007): 159
5  Meijers, Maurits J. Is Euroscepticism Contagious? Examining the Impact of Eurosceptic Challenger Parties on Mainstream Party Attitudes toward the European Union. PhD Thesis: Hertie 
School of Governance, Berlin, 2016: chap. 2
6.  Mudde, Cas. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007: 159
7.  Ibid.; Almeida, Dimitri. “Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 3 (September 2010): 237–53
8.  Fieschi, Catherine, James Shields, and Roger Woods. “Extreme Rightwing Parties and the European Union: France, Germany and Italy.” In Political Parties and the European 
Union, 235–53. London: Routledge, 1996: 237
9.  Betz, Hans-Georg. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Houndmills, London: Macmillan, 1994: 11
10.  cf. Keating, Michael. “The European Union and the Regions.” In The European Union and the Regions, edited by Barry Jones and Michael Keating, 1–22. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995
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FIGURE 1  Radical right party positions towards the EU over time
Mean and range of radical right EU positions on the basis of expert survey data by Ray and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). A party 
is categorized as Eurosceptic if the score of its overall orientation towards European integration is below 4. 
Data source:  Ray, “Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey”; Bakker et al., “1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey Trend File. Version 2015.1.”
With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, however, radical right parties came to unequivocally reject 
the European integration process. The Maastricht Treaty heralded a new era of political European integration 
as it introduced qualified-majority voting in the EU, established EU citizenship and paved the way for the 
European common currency. The overall development of radical right Euroscepticism is plotted in Figure 1.11
As Figure 1 demonstrates, for radical right parties there is a clear downward trend visible from 1992 onwards. 
The dots represent the average radical right EU position at that time, whereas the lines show the range of EU 
positions among radical right parties. The range of their EU positions decreased significantly signalling the 
development of increasingly homogeneous anti-EU positions among radical right parties. Crucially, not only did 
they change their positions on the EU, they came to regard the EU issue also increasingly important.12 For the 
British UK Independence Party (UKIP), its opposition to the Maastricht Treaty was a founding principle of the 
party as it was set up in 1993 by members of the Anti-Federalist League, a movement formed in 1991 to oppose 
the Maastricht Treaty.13 
Today, Euroscepticism is one of the core features of radical right politics in Europe. Not only has the integration 
of the EU been deepened in many respects, the sovereign debt crisis and the ensuing Eurozone crisis 
allowed the radical right to combine cultural identity arguments against the EU with utilitarian 
objections against the pooling of sovereignty. Nevertheless, there remain important differences 
between radical right parties across Europe. The Euroscepticism of Geert Wilders’ PVV, for instance, is a 
form of unconditional, so-called “hard Euroscepticism” or “Europhobia”. On the other hand, parties such 
11.  A party’s Euroscepticism is established on the basis of a party’s overall orientation towards European integration below 4 in the Ray and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 
expert survey data sets. See:  Ray, “Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey”; Bakker et al., “1999-2014 Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey Trend File. Version 2015.1.”
12.  Meijers, Maurits J. Is Euroscepticism Contagious? Examining the Impact of Eurosceptic Challenger Parties on Mainstream Party Attitudes toward the European Union. PhD Thesis: 
Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, 2016: chap. 2
13.  Ford, Robert, Matthew J. Goodwin, and David Cutts. “Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 
European Parliament Elections.” European Journal of Political Research 51, no. 2 (March 17, 2012): 204–34
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as the German AfD are more nuanced and represent a “softer” variant 
of Euroscepticism.14 Hence, whereas Wilders is a staunch advocate of a 
“Nexit”—a Dutch exit from the EU,  the AfD rejects the European common 
currency and the financial transfers within Europe, but notes that only if the 
European institutional framework could not be reformed, it would advocate 
the dissolution of the EU, which would allow the re-formation of a European 
economic community.15 
In addition, in some cases radical right parties have moderated their 
Eurosceptic appeal when faced with the prospect of governing or when in government. As part of 
successive Berlusconi governments, the Lega Nord did not push to enact specific anti-EU policies despite 
its Eurosceptic platform.16 Similarly, the Finns Party (“Perussuomalaiset”) have toned down opposition to 
European integration as they entered the Finnish government and its leader, Timo Soini, became Deputy 
Prime Minister in May 2015. 
1.2. Radical Left Euroscepticism 
The Euroscepticism of the radical left, on the other hand, is guided by economic concerns regarding 
the integration process. The wariness of radical left parties to the EU is more a product of their opposition 
to the free market economy and their quest for economic and social justice than a rejection of a polity with 
multinational constituents.17 The radical left regards the institutional structure and the policy-making logic 
of the EU to be ideologically biased toward market-liberal policies. Not unlike prominent EU scholars such as 
Fritz Scharpf, the radical left believes there is an institutional asymmetry in 
the EU in favour of market-making instead of market-regulation.18 Hence, the 
rejection of the EU accrues from the idea that the realization of egalitarian 
social policies is not possible in the current institutional framework. Of 
course, many scholars and commentators, perhaps most prominently 
Giandomenico Majone, reject this view of the EU as an essentially 
market-liberal polity as one-sided.19 Nevertheless, the lack of veritable 
common European social policies, serves as evidence to the radical 
left that the EU is inextricably a neo-liberal polity. 
Whereas the West European radical right gradually came to agree more or less on clear anti-European politics, 
the development of the radical left is less linear and more fraught with diversity. The Maastricht Treaty did 
not represent a clear turning point for all radical left parties. Whereas some radical left parties regarded the 
Maastricht Treaty and an entrenchment of market-liberal ideology in the European institutional framework, 
other parties carefully regarded the inception of a true European political union as a possibility to eventually 
reshape the EU into a vehicle for left-wing policies. 
14.  Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart. “Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation.” SEI Working Papers, no. 36 (2000); Yves 
Bertoncini and Nicole Koenig, “Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Voice vs. Exit?”, Policy Paper N. 121, Jacques Delors Institute, November 2014
15.  Alternative für Deutschland. “Programm Für Deutschland. Das Grundsatzprogramm Der Alternative Für Deutschland,” 2017
16.  Tarchi, Marco. “Italy: A Country of Many Populisms.” In Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, edited by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan 
McDonnell, 84–99. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007: 97
17.  March, Luke, and Cas Mudde. “What’s Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation.” Comparative European Politics 3, no. 1 (April 
2005): 23–49 ; Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole. J. Wilson. “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” Comparative Political Studies 35, 
no. 8 (October 1, 2002): 965–89
18.  Scharpf, Fritz W. “Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States.” In Governance in the European Union, SAGE, 1996: 15-18
19.  Majone 1996
 TODAY, 
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FIGURE 2  Radical left party positions towards the EU over time
Mean and range of radical left EU positions on the basis of expert survey data by Ray and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). A party is 
categorized as Eurosceptic if the score of its overall orientation towards European integration is below 4. 
Data source:  Ray, “Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey”; Bakker et al., “1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
Trend File. Version 2015.1.”
From Figure 2 it is apparent that the range of radical left EU positions is indeed rather large. Moreover, 
the radical left has shown divergent paths when it comes to the evolution of their positions on European 
integration. While the majority of radical left parties remain Eurosceptic, the average trend line shows that 
radical left EU support on average has increased from the 1980s until the mid-2000s, after which it slightly 
decreased. A number of radical left parties have consistently held anti-European positions. For the Dutch SP 
(Socialistische Partij, Socialist Party), for instance, fierce Euroscepticism is a consistent feature of its party 
identity.20 Also in its campaign for the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election, the SP unfailingly attacked the 
EU for its alleged facilitation of big business at the cost of the ordinary citizen. In Denmark, the fiercely 
Eurosceptic Red-Green Alliance, fused radical left socialist views with ecological concerns, has advocated the 
abolishment of the EU and has maintained an anti-European position throughout the years.21
Other radical left parties have shifted their positions on European integration over the years. The Greek 
SYRIZA is a case in point as it became more opposed to European integration over the years: In its early days in 
1980s and 1990s, the precursor of SYRIZA was initially very supportive of European integration. However, in 
the 2000s they made Euroscepticism a core aspect of their programme. Its anti-EU stance in combination with 
its outsider status made the party a credible frontrunner of the anti-Memorandum, anti-austerity sentiment in 
Greece as they won the January 2015 elections. Yet, Aléxis Tsípras ultimate decision to accept another bailout 
accompanied with a set of austerity measures in July and August 2015, has shown that SYRIZA, to a certain 
extent, has been willing to move beyond its principled opposition to the EU. 
A similar move to less Eurosceptic, more pragmatist attitudes toward the EU when in government has been 
visible in the French PCF (Parti communiste français, French Communist Party), for instance. Although 
Euroscepticism had been a defining characteristic of the French PCF in the 1980s and 1990s, it moderated its 
opposition to Europe during its government participation in the 1997 Jospin government.22 Nevertheless, the 
party reverted to its anti-European platform after it severely lost in the 2002 elections and formed the joint list 
20.  Keith, Dan. “Ready to Get Their Hands Dirty: The Socialist Party and GroenLinks in the Netherlands.” In Left Parties in National Governments, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010: 164; March, Luke. Radical Left Parties in Europe. London: Routledge, 2011: 130
21.  Ibid., 105
22. Bell, David. “The French Extreme Left and Its Suspicion of Power.” In Left Parties in National Governments, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010: 40
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Front de Gauche with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s Parti de Gauche “to fight the ‘Europe of the Lisbon Treaty’”.23 The 
Danish Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People’s Party, SF), also advocated a withdrawal from the EEC until 
the mid-1980s, but significantly moderated its Euroscepticism in the subsequent years in order to distinguish 
itself from its radical left competitor Red–Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne) and to appeal a more 
mainstream electorate and make government participation feasible.24 
1.3. Is Euroscepticism Inevitably a Form of Nationalism?
Some scholars argue that both radical left Euroscepticism and racial right Euroscepticism are rooted in a 
nationalist predisposition.25 Whereas radical right nationalism relies on a nativist notion of the nation, 
the radical left nationalism is a consequence of their defence of the “popular class.” Equating the 
working class with the nation, the radical left regards the EU is not only a market-liberal construct, but also 
a threat to the territorial integrity necessary to conduct true “socialist policies”. This attitude is, for instance, 
visible in the Dutch SP, which “wants to restrict the size of the EU budget and limit EU powers on social 
issues and foreign policy” and “criticises unrestricted migration from new member states for displacing Dutch 
workers and resulting in the exploitation of migrant workers”26. Yet, while some radical left parties, such as 
the Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, KKE), explicitly state that egalitarianism 
can only be realised within the framework of the nation-state, not all radical left parties share the view that 
democracy and social rights are impossible beyond the nation state. 
Indeed, whereas both the radical right and radical left are highly critical of the development of the European 
integration project, some radical left parties harbour the belief that the EU can reformed from within. The 
anti-polity opposition of radical left parties is, therefore, conditional on whether they believe the 
institutional framework of the EU has the potential to be reformed. Although both types of Euroscepticism 
are manifestations of principled polity opposition, the radical left’s opposition is not an opposition to the 
principle of supranational governance per se.27 It is important to note, however, that many radical right parties 
also state in their party manifesto’s that they are in favour of some kind of European cooperation.28 To be sure, 
this is not necessarily a contradiction, since the radical right is still fundamentally opposed to the European 
polity. While most radical right parties are vague about what forms of European cooperation they 
envisage, the emphasis lies on collaboration between sovereign nations without the transfer or 
pooling of sovereignty. 
All in all, this overview of the dynamic and heterogeneous ideological 
bases of Eurosceptic parties demonstrates that political parties not 
only choose to oppose the EU for distinct ideological reasons, but that 
these stances are also subject to change when the process of integration 
changes. Hence, while Euroscepticism is likely here to stay, it is more than 
likely that for many parties its main tenets will develop as the nature of 
European unification changes.
23.  quoted from March, Luke. Radical Left Parties in Europe. London: Routledge, 2011: 68
24.  Ibid., 103; Christensen, Dag Arne. “The Danish Socialist People’s Party: Still Waiting After All These Years.” In Left Parties in National Governments, 121–38. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Christensen, Dag Arne. “The Left-Wing Opposition in Denmark, Norway and Sweden: Cases of Europhobia?” West European Politics 19, no. 3 (July 
1996): 525–46
25.  Halikiopoulou, Daphne, Kyriaki Nanou, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. “The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism.” 
European Journal of Political Research 51, no. 4 (June 7, 2012): 504–39
26.  Keith, Dan. “Ready to Get Their Hands Dirty: The Socialist Party and GroenLinks in the Netherlands.” In Left Parties in National Governments, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010: 165
27.  de Wilde, Pieter, and Hans-Jörg Trenz. “Denouncing European Integration: Euroscepticism as Polity Contestation.” European Journal of Social Theory 15, no. 4 (March 14, 
2012): 537–54
28.  Mudde, Cas. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007: 165
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2. The Development of Public Euroscepticism
Although this Policy Paper is principally concerned with the political supply of Euroscepticism by political 
parties, it is important to note that not only the ideological profiles of Eurosceptic parties have evolved, but 
that we see a similar development in public attitudes toward European integration. This lends further support 
to the claim that Euroscepticism is not simply a strategic political tool used by fringe parties to bolster its 
anti-establishment profile. Instead, party-based Euroscepticism and public Euroscepticism have clear 
ideological bases and are reactive to developments of European integration.
A recent study demonstrated empirically that fears related to the process of European integration differ in 
kind among left-wing voters and right-wing voters—akin to the contrasting motivations among radical right 
and radical left parties to oppose the EU.29 Whereas left-wing voters’ fears regarding the European unification 
process are rooted in worries about socio-economic issues such as the loss of social security, the fears of right 
wing voters are grounded in concerns that European integration constitutes a loss of national identity and causes 
one’s own country to lose power in global politics while also increasingly transferring money to the European 
level.30 Moreover, research has shown that left and right Eurosceptic voters differ in the quality of their EU 
opposition. Like many radical left parties, voters on the left fringes of the political spectrum who strongly support 
the redistribution of economic resources tend to be Eurosceptic. For voters on the right pole of the spectrum, on 
the other hand, anti-immigration sentiments are related to opposition to European integration.31 
The previous section established that Euroscepticism among parties is a diverse and dynamic phenomenon. 
In particular, for many parties, especially among the radical right, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty was a 
pivotal moment. A similar development is visible among European electorates. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s opposition to the European unification process was primarily a left-wing affair. On average, 
European voters with a left-wing ideological profile were more likely to hold negative positions toward the EU 
than right-wing voters. Remarkably, voters on the far right pole of the left-right spectrum were not particularly 
likely to hold anti-European views in this period. Yet, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, public 
Euroscepticism was no longer an exclusive left-wing affair. The propensity of voters on the far right to 
espouse Eurosceptic views has risen in both the 1990s and the 2000s. At the same time, voters on the far 
left side of the spectrum toned down their Euroscepticism slightly.32 This post-Maastricht shift in EU attitudes 
of far right voters is telling, because it can be regarded as a prelude of the rising importance of cultural and 
identity-based arguments in EU politics. When French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005, cultural anti-EU arguments played a big role—especially in the Netherlands.
Of course, this brief summary of these developments in public 
Euroscepticism glosses over some variation across countries. Nevertheless, 
it is striking that the fact that the developments among radical left and 
radical right parties in Western Europe and the average development 
among far left and far right voters are very similar. The heterogeneous and 
dynamic nature of both party-based and public Euroscepticism suggests that 
Euroscepticism is not merely “a touchstone of dissent”, as Paul Taggart33 noted in 
1998, but that this is, and has been, a broad political phenomenon for which there 
is both political supply and political demand. 
29.  van Elsas, E., and W. van der Brug. “The Changing Relationship between Left-Right Ideology and Euroscepticism, 1973-2010.” European Union Politics 16, no. 2 (2015): 194–215
30.  Ibid.
31.  van Elsas, Erika J, Hakhverdian, Armen and van der Brug, Wouter. “United against a Common Foe ? The Nature and Origins of Euroscepticism among Left-Wing and Right-
Wing Citizens.” West European Politics 39, no. 6 (2016): 1181–1204
32.  van Elsas, E., and W. van der Brug. “The Changing Relationship between Left-Right Ideology and Euroscepticism, 1973-2010.” European Union Politics 16, no. 2 (2015): 194–215
33.  Taggart, Paul. “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems.” European Journal of Political Research 33, no. 3 (April 1998): 363–88
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3. The Effects of Euroscepticism on Mainstream 
Parties and Domestic Politics
Following the Brexit referendum it is clear that anti-European politics can have serious consequences for 
individual member states as well as for the course of the European integration. Yet, also beyond such extreme 
and rare cases of Eurosceptic success, Eurosceptic parties have been able to influence party competition over 
EU attitudes in many countries. Especially given the fact that Eurosceptic parties rarely achieve national 
office—and when they do, as in the case of SYRIZA or the Finns Party, they moderate their anti-EU appeal—it 
is important to examine the indirect effects of Euroscepticism. 
How does Eurosceptic politics affect the ways in which mainstream parties (i.e. parties with governing 
experience) have dealt with EU issues? On average, between 1984 and 2010, mainstream parties shift their 
positions toward less pro-EU positions whenever Eurosceptic challenger parties were successful in the 
national elections.34 Differentiating between the impact of radical left and radical Eurosceptic challenger 
success, research found that radical right Euroscepticism affected both centre-left parties and centre-
right parties, whereas radical left Euroscepticism only affected centre-left parties. The substantive 
explanation for this is, is that the cultural logic of radical right Euroscepticism resonates with many culturally 
conservative voters. Wary of losing the vote of lower educated, culturally more conservative voters, centre-left 
parties shifted toward slightly less positive positions. On the other hand, the centre-right is not threatened by 
the radical left, because their anti-neoliberal opposition to the EU is not likely to be attractive for centre-right 
voters. These findings are in line with comparative politics findings on domestic party competition over the 
issue of immigration, which also show centre-left parties to be sensitive to radical right success.35 In a similar 
vein, another study focusing on Euroscepticism among voters has shown that large parties tend adapt their 
positions during European Parliament elections when faced with a Eurosceptic public.36 
Yet, Eurosceptic politics does not only affect the positions of mainstream parties toward European integration, 
it also affects the importance that parties attach to the European integration issue. Indeed, radical left and 
radical right Eurosceptic parties function as so-called “issue entrepreneurs”: they put the EU issue on 
the domestic political agenda.37 Particularly because mainstream parties for a long time have tried to avoid 
the EU issue, Eurosceptic parties were able to push it onto agenda and reap the electoral gains from doing so.38 
In addition, research has shown that Eurosceptic challenger parties are capable of forcing mainstream par-
ties to increasingly emphasize the issue. A study on the parliamentary activities on European Union issues in 
the Danish parliament has shown that challenger parties’ parliamentary 
questions on European affairs motivate mainstream opposition parties to 
increasingly discuss the EU issue.39 These mainstream opposition parties, 
in turn, are able to affect the attention mainstream governing parties pay 
to the issue. In a similar vein, research from the 2009 and 2014 European 
Parliamentary campaigns in France and the Netherlands have shown that radi-
cal right emphasis of the EU issue during the campaign leads mainstream par-
ties to increasingly emphasize the EU issue in the news media.40
34.  Meijers, Maurits J. “Contagious Euroscepticism? The Impact of Eurosceptic Support on Mainstream Party Positions on European Integration.” Party Politics, 2015, 1–11
35.  Abou-Chadi, Tarik. “Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts - How Green and Far-Right Parties Differ in Their Impact.” British Journal of Political Science 46, 
no. 2 (2016): 417–36; Van Spanje, Joost. “Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western 
Europe.” Party Politics 16, no. 5 (March 2, 2010): 563–86
36.  Williams, Christopher J., and Jae-Jae Spoon. “Differentiated Party Response: The Effect of Euroskeptic Public Opinion on Party Positions.” European Union Politics 16, no. 2 
(2015): 176–93
37.  de Vries, Catherine E., and Sara B. Hobolt. “When Dimensions Collide: The Electoral Success of Issue Entrepreneurs.” European Union Politics 13, no. 2 (May 23, 2012): 246–68
38.  Ibid.
39.  van de Wardt, Marc. “Desperate Needs, Desperate Deeds: Why Mainstream Parties Respond to the Issues of Niche Parties.” West European Politics 38, no. 1 (2015): 93–122
40.  Meijers, Maurits J., and Christian Rauh. “Has Eurosceptic Mobilization Become More Contagious? Comparing the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament Elections in The 
Netherlands and France.” Politics and Governance 4, no. 1 (2016): 83–103
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Thus even if Eurosceptic parties do not become governing parties, they incrementally influence the ways in 
which European Union politics is conducted at the member-state level. Bonnie Meguid has noted in her study 
of niche parties in Western Europe that “competition between party unequals has ramifications for the long-
run competition between mainstream party equals”.41 In other words, the competition between challenger 
parties on the fringes of the political spectrum with political parties at the centre of the spectrum 
is likely to influence the ways in which centrist parties interact with one another on the EU issue. 
4. The Effects of Euroscepticism on European Integration
The previous section pointed to research which attested that mainstream parties are responsive to the 
presence and success of Eurosceptic parties and a Eurosceptic public with respect to their positions on and 
attention to the EU issue in the domestic political arena. Yet, what does this mean for the process of European 
integration itself? The fact that mainstream parties are in such a systematic way responsive to popular 
sentiment on European issues as well as to changes in their political surroundings, might suggest that 
the much-discussed deficits of political representation in the EU are overstated. After all, mainstream parties 
do seem to approach the EU issue strategically—incorporating popular demands. Hence, one could argue 
that although voters lack direct policy influence, they might be able to influence the process of European 
integration indirectly. 
In theory, this is not improbable because, as the late Peter Mair forcefully argued in 2007, ultimately the 
intergovernmental arena is key when it comes to making integration steps.42 According to Mair, EU politics 
can be divided into two dimensions: the Europeanization dimension and the functional dimension. In the 
Europeanization dimension of EU politics, decisions are taken regarding the establishment and consolidation 
of authoritative supranational institutions as well as with respect to widening the territorial scope of the EU 
through enlargement.43 Political contestation over whether the EU should have more or less competences in a 
certain policy area, therefore, pertain to the Europeanization dimension. In the functional dimension, political 
actors compete over how the EU should function and which types of policies it should enact within the current 
institutional framework.44 Not fundamental questions about the evolution of the European polity are central to 
the functional dimension. Rather functional EU contestation revolves around ideological and interest-specific 
debate over policy issues on which the EU already has acquired competences. 
The importance of distinguishing between these different forms of EU politics lies in Mair’s argument that 
there is a crucial mismatch between the two main channels of democratic representation in the EU 
—national elections and European Parliament (EP) elections—and dimensions of EU politics which are central 
to these channels of representation. Whereas political parties, both on the fringes and in the centre of the 
political spectrum, extensively discussed their visions for the future of the EU polity during European elections, 
domestic election campaigns, for a long time at least, tended to neglect issues concerning the Europeanization 
dimension. This is striking because the elected members of the European parliaments (MEPs), in effect, do not 
have the competences to shape the process of European integration. Instead, only member-state governments 
in the European Council are able to decide on endowing the EU with further competences. Mair lamented this 
paradox of European Union politics. The real time and place to debate European integration in meaningful way 
are national elections, not EP elections.
41.  Meguid, Bonnie M. “Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (September 2, 2005): 359
42.  Mair, Peter. “Political Opposition and the European Union.” Government and Opposition 42, no. 1 (2007): 1–17
43.  Ibid., 9.
44.  Ibid., 10.
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Mair’s analysis resonates with the argument that mainstream parties 
for a long time purposely avoided the EU issue as much as they could, 
especially during national election campaigns.45 For a long time, the 
strategy of keeping EU issues under wraps worked well in many member 
states. The relative complacency of the electorates regarding European 
affairs allowed member-state governing parties a lot of latitude to devise 
their party-political strategies toward “Europe”. Yet as the EU evolved from a 
common market to a form of political union, opposition to European integration 
among the public gradually mounted. The French and Dutch rejection of the 2005 
referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty are often regarded as a turning point, as the rejection of 
the Constitution presented a first instance in which mass domestic politics stopped the integration process 
in its tracks. Moreover, the popularity of parties with distinct Eurosceptic platforms augmented—signalling a 
profound change in the way EU politics is conducted at the national level.
To some political scientists, the growing salience of EU politics and the growing Euroscepticism among parties 
and voters suggested that European Union politics was “finally” subjected to mass politics.46 In other words, 
domestic party contestation is increasingly relevant for the future of the EU as it would affect the course 
of the integration process. Taking seriously Mair’s argument in 2007 that there is a mismatch between the 
different types of EU politics and the associated channels of democratic representation, this, of course, can be 
interpreted as good news. 
The growing politicization of European integration issues in the domestic arena and during national 
election campaigns puts EU politics on the political agenda.47 After all, the fact that political questions 
concerning fundamental developments of our societies are discussed within the public sphere is regarded 
by many, not in the least by Jürgen Habermas, as sine qua non for democratic politics.48 Therefore, those 
Eurosceptic challenger parties, of which empirical studies have demonstrated they can pressure mainstream 
parties to increasingly emphasize the EU issue in the domestic arena, suggests—from a democratic theory 
perspective—have made an important contribution in making EU politics more of a level playing field. 49 Since 
the onset of Euroscepticism, also non-mainstream parties, which are usually side lined in supranational 
decision-making processes, have become important players in EU politics. This is of course not to say the 
cultural-nativist arguments of the radical right, or the market-liberal rejection of the radical left is well-
founded. The point is that the Eurosceptic left and right made important contributions putting an important, 
previously neglected issue on the domestic political agenda.
Moreover, the finding that mainstream parties react to both public opinion 
shifts and electoral success of Eurosceptic parties, shows there is some 
degree of responsiveness to public concern on EU issues. Whether 
these shifts in mainstream party policy are, in fact, strategic or, rather, 
constitute profound ideological reconfigurations of the parties in 
question is not clear, as the next sections highlights. Moreover, it is 
important to emphasize that the argument made here is not that such 
EU policy shifts are per se laudable, or the opposite for that matter. 
The key issue is that this evidence shows that centrist parties are willing to adapt their positions on 
European integration in order to capture the median voter—displaying a degree of responsiveness 
on EU politics that was previously not accounted for. Given that both Eurosceptic voters and Eurosceptic 
parties hold such anti-European positions for clearly definable ideological reasons, moreover, suggests that 
45.  Steenbergen, Marco R, and David J Scott. “Contesting Europe? The Salience of European Integration as a Party Issue.” In European Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004: 165–92
46.  Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole. J. Wilson. “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 8 (October 
1, 2002): 965–89
47.  Hutter, Swen, Edgar Grande, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. Politicising Europe: Mass Politics and Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016
48.  Calhoun, Craig. “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere, 1–48. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992
49.  Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971
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meaningful political contestation about European integration is essential. In other words, we can no longer 
afford to sweep European affairs under the carpet of domestic politics, and given the growing 
salience of the EU issue and the heterogeneity of political positions on the EU issue within domestic 
political arenas, this is probably a good thing.
5. Further Integration despite Responsiveness to Euroscepticism?
The question is how these forms of domestic responsiveness on EU issues translate to governments’ political 
stances in the European Council or the Council of Ministers. Do these shifts in positions towards the EU 
among West European mainstream parties translate to a change of direction with respect to actual European 
integration process?
The answer to this question is not straightforward, particularly because we lack specific empirical studies 
connecting domestic European Union politics with the policy-making processes on the European level. There 
are a number of studies which show that societal political pressure has resulted in changed behaviour in EU 
policy-making. For instance, recent empirical findings point to the fact that member state governments engage 
in “signal responsiveness” in the European Council indicating that governments might oppose legislation 
which delegates powers to the EU in response to public Euroscepticism.50 Moreover, there is evidence that the 
European Commission—in theory insulated from political contestation—does respond to public politicization, 
e.g. when devising European consumer policy.51 In addition, there is evidence that member states slow down 
the transposition of EU legislation when faced with higher levels of public Euroscepticism.52
At the same time, however, despite the mounting of opposition 
to European integration and the electoral gains of Eurosceptic 
parties in recent years, the integration process itself has progressed 
significantly. In the course of the Eurozone crisis, EU member states 
have taken further integration steps which touch upon the core of national 
sovereignty. For instance, the reduction of national autonomy in budgetary policy 
by means of the Fiscal Compact and the centralisation of banking supervision 
through the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) are major 
integration steps.53 Some even argue that “at least in the short run the economic and financial crisis has created 
an opportunity structure for European integration rather than an obstacle”.54 
Hence, mass EU politicization has not halted the process of European integration process. Yet, the observation 
that integration has continued despite public opposition and EU politicization does not mean that mass EU 
politics at the domestic level has not influenced the course of integration at all. Frank Schimmelfennig argues 
that mass EU contestation has led national governments to purposively shield integration steps from mass 
politicization at the domestic level by avoiding treaty changes which would necessitate referendums in many 
countries.55 Thus, although mass EU contestation did not result in a complete halt to the integration process, it 
has constrained governments’ ability to devise fundamental reforms of the EU. 
These observations suggest that despite the increased salience of the EU issue and the apparent responsiveness of 
mainstream parties in the domestic context, the integration process and the domestic channof representation are 
still decoupled. Particularly, a situation wherein mainstream parties tone down their support for European 
50.  Hagemann, Sara, Sara B. Hobolt, and Christopher Wratil. “Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting.” Comparative Political Studies, 2016, 1–27
51.  Rauh, Christian. A Responsive Technocracy? EU Politicisation and the Consumer Policies of the European Commission. ECPR Press, 2016
52.  Williams, Christopher J. “Responding through Transposition: Public Euroskepticism and European Policy Implementation.” European Political Science Review, 2016, 1–20
53.  Schimmelfennig, Frank. “European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism.” Journal of European Integration 36, no. 3 (February 12, 2014): 321–37
54.  Tosun, Jale, Anne Wetzel, and Galina Zapryanova. “The EU in Crisis: Advancing the Debate.” Journal of European Integration 36, no. 3 (April 29, 2014): 208
55.  Schimmelfennig, Frank. “European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism.” Journal of European Integration 36, no. 3 (February 12, 2014): 321–37
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integration and increasingly emphasize the EU issue, while nonetheless furthering integration, and shield 
the integration process from politicization, is therefore particularly problematic for EU governance. 
A good illustration of this is a recent remark by the Alexander Pechtold, leader of the Dutch social-liberal party D66, 
to Mark Rutte, Dutch Prime Minister and leader of the conservative-liberal party VVD in a recent television debate 
for the recent 2017 Dutch national elections. With respect to European integration issues, Pechtold accused Rutte 
of acting like a radical right party at home, but like a pro-European in Brussels.56 Rutte responded by noting that, 
as a governing party, one has to make compromises with 27 other member states when negotiating in Brussels. 
In other words, the need for consensus at the EU level inevitably entails making in-roads in one’s own party 
platform. And indeed, it remains an open question what such responses of mainstream parties and national 
governments to Eurosceptic politics actually indicate. On the one hand, they could signify opportunistic 
strategies for immediate domestic electoral gain to attract less EU-minded voters. It also possible, however, that 
the limited capacity of the EU’s institutional framework to accommodate political conflict and disagreement 
over integration steps stifles a meaningful translation of domestic EU politics to the supranational level. 
Peter Mair argued that precisely the lack of an institutional framework that facilitates the contestation over 
European politics makes European integration politics a zero-sum game. Either one consents to “the package 
deal of EU politics” or one rejects the “package” by voting for an outright Eurosceptic parties. The consensus-
driven logic of EU politics in the Council hardly allows for tailor-
made political solutions—as the contentious debates between the Greek 
government and the EU as well as the negotiations between former British 
prime-minister David Cameron and the EU have shown. Therefore, given the 
current institutional framework, it is not per se “irrational” or “emotional” of 
voters to elect anti-European representatives.57 If one believes that the direction 
the Union is moving towards is contrary to one’s political interests or beliefs, one 
has no choice but to reject the polity as a whole.
Therefore, if the process of European integration continues despite the fact that the success of Eurosceptic 
politics leads to more public debate about Europe and causes positions shifts of mainstream parties in the 
domestic arena, this is likely to further spur disaffection with mainstream parties’ EU politics. Hence, despite 
mainstream party attempts to accommodate anti-European concerns, there is a genuine risk such 
a strategy in combination with the consent to further integration steps will lead to even stronger 
support for Eurosceptic parties. In essence, this suggests the presence of a vicious circle, wherein increased 
Euroscepticism inevitably leads to more Euroscepticism as governing parties struggle with translating 
“Eurosceptic signals” to political outcomes in “Brussels.” 
In other words, these observations suggest there is not much to be gained for pro-European mainstream parties 
in co-opting radical left and radical right positions on the issue of European integration. Instead, there might 
be more gained politically in the long-term with a programmatic response to Euroscepticism on which these 
parties, when in government, can follow suit in the European Council. This could be a staunch pro-European 
platform which mainstream parties advocate with conviction—proposing EU-based solutions for current 
defects in the fabric of European integration. Yet, this could also involve critical, but constructive proposals 
on how national sovereignty and European decision-making can be balanced. The key issue is, however, that 
governing parties formulate a clear political stance toward European integration and, subsequently, commit 
themselves to this stance “in Brussels”. While this can come at the cost of efficiency and consensus in the 
Council, this will facilitate a meaningful debate on European integration “at home”—which is still the main 
channel of democratic representation.
56.  RTL, Carré Débat, March 4, 2017.
57.  de Wilde, Pieter, and Hans-Jörg Trenz. “Denouncing European Integration: Euroscepticism as Polity Contestation.” European Journal of Social Theory 15, no. 4 (March 14, 
2012): 537–54
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CONCLUSION
This Policy Paper has demonstrated that Euroscepticism in Western Europe is a rather diverse phenomenon, 
which has a differentiated effect on EU politics as a whole. The argument was made that Euroscepticism 
has to be taken seriously—both as a societal and a party-political phenomenon. Voters clearly react to the 
changing nature of the European Union as the surge of far right public Euroscepticism since the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 suggests. In addition, the different reasons to reject the EU among the radical left and radical 
right are echoed by voters on the far left and far right. This suggests that if one wants to deal with this 
“wave of Euroscepticism”, one has to address these substantive ideological concerns regarding the European 
unification process.
The paper also pointed to a number of important empirical findings demonstrating that mainstream parties 
react to Eurosceptic politics in a number of ways: they adapt their positions in reaction to both Eurosceptic 
challenger party success and public opinion and they increasingly address the EU issue when Eurosceptic 
parties do so as well. While this highlights a certain degree of responsiveness of national mainstream parties 
in EU politics, the mode of integration “by stealth” during the Eurozone crisis in the face of greater 
societal opposition to the EU likely exacerbates the key problem. In particular, the simultaneous position 
shifts and continued integration call the credibility of mainstream parties’ EU platforms into question. 
The political parties campaigning for national elections in 2017 have decided to adopt different strategies. 
Rather than attempting to accommodate Eurosceptic fears, politicians such as the French presidential 
candidate Emmanuel Macron or the progressive GreenLeft and social-liberal D66 in the Netherlands have 
opted for unabashed pro-European platforms. Perhaps a convinced plea for the need of European integration 
that specifically takes into account both socio-economic and cultural arguments against the EU, can therefore 
rekindle support for the project of European integration.
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